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Emigration has contributed to a shortage of doctors in many sub-Saharan African countries. Specialty
training is highly valued by doctors and a potential tool for retention. Yet not all types of training may be
valued equally. In the ﬁrst study to examine preferences for postgraduate training in depth, we carried
out a discrete choice experiment as part of a cross-sectional survey of all Malawian doctors within seven
years of graduation and not yet in specialty training. Over August 2012 to March 2013, 148 doctors took
part out of 153 eligible in Malawi. Despite evidence that specialty training is highly sought after,
Malawian junior doctors would not accept all types of training. Doctors preferred timely training outside
of Malawi in core specialties (internal medicine, general surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics & gynaecology).
Specialty preferences are particularly strong, with most junior doctors requiring nearly double their
monthly salary to accept training all in Malawi and over six-fold to accept training in ophthalmology
(representing a bundle of unpopular but priority specialties). In contrast, the location of work before
training did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence most doctors' choices when guaranteed specialty training. Using a
latent class model, we identiﬁed four subgroups of junior doctors with distinct preferences. Policy
simulations showed that these preferences could be leveraged by policymakers to improve retention in
exchange for guaranteed specialty training, however incentivising the uptake of training in priority
specialties will only be effective in those with more ﬂexible preferences. These results indicate that
indiscriminate expansion of postgraduate training to slow emigration of doctors from sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries may not be effective unless doctors' preferences are taken into account.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Of the 30 countries with the fewest doctors per population
worldwide, 27 are in sub-Saharan Africa (World Health
Organization, 2015). This paucity of doctors constrains the de-
livery of essential services and responses to new health threats,
such as the rollout of antiretroviral treatment or the recent Ebola
epidemic in West Africa (Sidibe and Campbell, 2015; World Healthth and Development, London
vistock Place, London WC1H
Mandeville).
ndon, United Kingdom.
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r Ltd. This is an open access articleOrganization, 2006). Factors contributing to the current situation
include both low production and high emigration of doctors
(Mullan et al., 2011; World Health Organization, 2006). Out of 105
medical schools surveyed in the Sub-Saharan African Medical
Schools Study, half produced less than one hundred graduates in
2008 (Mullan et al., 2011). Of the doctors trained in sub-Saharan
African medical schools, those who are now registered in the USA
are equivalent to 22.7%, 26.2%, and 52.3% of the medical workforce
in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Liberia respectively (Tankwanchi et al.,
2013).
In response, there has been an unprecedented investment in
undergraduate medical education in sub-Saharan Africa, with 58
new medical schools established since 1990 and many existing
schools mandated to expand enrolment (Mullan et al., 2011). In
contrast, there has been less focus on specialty training, the periodunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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general practitioner (World Federation for Medical Education,
2003; World Organization of Family Doctors, 2013). This is
despite evidence that such training is highly valued by doctors and
a strong driver for emigration (Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008). For
example, a survey of 1619 non-European Union doctors working in
the United Kingdom (UK) found that three out of four identiﬁed
postgraduate training opportunities as their main reason for
emigration (George et al., 2007). The desire to pursue specialty
training increased the intention to emigrate within ﬁve years of
qualiﬁcation for medical students in eight low- and middle-income
countries (LMIC), including ﬁve in sub-Saharan Africa (Silvestri
et al., 2014). And nearly 90% of those doctors trained in sub-
Saharan Africa but registered in the United States had completed
their specialty training there rather than in their country of training
(Tankwanchi et al., 2013). Yet only a third of sub-Saharan African
medical schools offer such programmes, with a total of 1909 spe-
cialty training places for the 7861 graduates every year (Mullan
et al., 2011). Offering more specialty training, therefore, is an
attractive option for policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa seeking to
maximise retention of their new medical graduates.
Retaining doctors is particularly important in Malawi, which has
the second lowest ratio of doctors to people in the world (World
Health Organization, 2015). Malawian doctors used to be trained
in the UK, with the result that many never returned (Broadhead and
Muula, 2002). In response, the one public medical school (College
of Medicine-University of Malawi, COM) was established in 1991,
with enrolment of ﬁrst-year students reaching 105 in 2014
(Broadhead and Muula, 2002; University of Malawi (2014)). Con-
cerns over continued health worker emigration, however, led to the
implementation of a six-year emergency programme in 2005 that
included a 52% salary increase for doctors (Management Sciences
for Health, 2010). Despite this, a study tracing COM graduates
from 2006 to 2012 found that the odds of junior doctors being
outside Malawi and the public sector increased with time after
graduation, with most doctors outside Malawi in specialty training
(Mandeville et al., 2014b). While enrolment to medical school
tripled under the emergency programme, this was not matched by
funding for specialty training (Management Sciences for Health,
2010). Given that previous studies have found that many medical
students and junior doctors inMalawi intend to specialise, specialty
training may prove a more effective tool for retention in the short-
term than ﬁnancial incentives (Bailey et al., 2012; Mandeville et al.,
2012; Sawatsky et al., 2014). What is uncertain, however, is
whether all kinds of specialty training would be equally effective.
Depending on the availability of trainers for different specialties,
Malawian doctors receive specialty training all in Malawi, all in
South Africa (or other African countries), or split between the two
(Zijlstra and Broadhead, 2007). Qualitative research has shown that
junior doctors hold ambivalent views about specialty training un-
dertaken entirely in Malawi (Bailey et al., 2012; Sawatsky et al.,
2014). In addition, scholarships available in certain specialties -
such as ophthalmology, anaesthetics or dermatology - have suf-
fered from poor uptake from junior doctors. These specialties are a
priority for training in terms of disease burden and available
expertise in Malawi, yet are less established than the “core” spe-
cialties that dominate undergraduate training and internship: in-
ternal medicine, general surgery, paediatrics, and obstetrics &
gynaecology (Bailey et al., 2012; Palmer et al., 2014; Schulze
Schwering et al., 2014). Collectively, this evidence suggests that
while junior doctors desire specialty training, not all training may
be valued equally. Before specialty training can be used effectively
to improve retention in Malawi, more information is needed on
junior doctors' preferences towards different kinds of training.
Discrete choice experiments are a quantitative method for elicitingpreferences that are being used increasingly to inform health pol-
icy, particularly healthworkforce policy in low- andmiddle-income
countries (Clark et al., 2014; de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012;Mandeville
et al., 2014a; M Ryan et al., 2008; M Ryan et al., 2012). We therefore
used a discrete choice experiment to investigate specialty training
preferences of Malawian junior doctors.2. Methods
2.1. Choice task design
To identify potential attributes and levels and obtain contextual
information to inform the choice task design, we conducted a
systematic review of DCEs focused on health workforce policy
(Mandeville et al., 2014a) and a narrative review of literature
investigating the health workforce crisis in Malawi. Possible attri-
butes and levels were narrowed down through semi-structured
interviews conducted with purposively sampling key informants
(n ¼ 18) and members of the target population (n ¼ 19). Key in-
formants were identiﬁed by snowball sampling and included pol-
icymakers, COM medical educationalists, specialist clinicians,
hospital directors, and representatives of professional and hospital
associations (Patton, 1990). To ensure common views were
captured, junior doctors were sampled for maximum variation in
age, job role, location and gender (Coast et al., 2004; Patton, 1990).
We also interviewed doctors working outside the public sector
(n ¼ 4) and those that had left Malawi (n ¼ 3) (Patton, 1990). Data
were thematically analysed in NVivo version 10 (QSR International
Pty Ltd, Doncaster).
Informed by this qualitative work, ﬁve attributes were selected
that were both important to junior doctors and also potential policy
levers. As our primary interest was the trade-off junior doctors
would make between different aspects of specialty training, we
used a generic rather than labelled design that presented two
alternative hypothetical posts in the Malawian public sector (Job A
versus Job B). In both jobs, a specialty training place would be
guaranteed, but only after some time working in the public sector.
This work would differ in the two job characteristics found to be
most important to junior doctors and one policy lever:
 Salary. The monthly net salary paid before training. This
included the basic salary for most junior doctors, MWK110,000
($411 at exchange rates prevailing at the time, obtained from
www.xe.com) as well as increments that were both realistic
from a policy perspective and attractive to participants: 130,000
($484); 160,000 ($596) or 200,000 ($746).
 Job location. The location of the hospital where this work would
be undertaken. These were initially the two types of hospital in
Malawi (central and district), but two subdivisions were made
based on nuances emerging from the qualitative work. The ﬁnal
levels weremajor central hospital (located in the twomain cities
of Malawi, best facilities and most specialists), minor central
hospital (located in smaller cities with poorer facilities and few
specialists), district hospital near a major town (deﬁned as less
than 2 h' drive therefore providing proximity to urban ame-
nities), and remote district hospital (more than 2 h' drive,
limited amenities) (Bailey et al., 2012).
 Time before training. The amount of time required in the job
before starting specialty training. While at least two years of
training is nominally required before entry to specialty training,
this has not always been enforced in the past. Some participants
in the qualitative work were also prepared to work for up to ﬁve
years in exchange for guaranteed specialty training. The ﬁnal
levels were therefore: 1, 2, 3 or 5 years. While best practice
K.L. Mandeville et al. / Social Science & Medicine 169 (2016) 109e118 111would be equally spaced levels, these were felt to be more
realistic for participants.
The specialty training places would also differ in the two aspects
found to be most important to junior doctors:
 Training location. Here, levels represented the most common
options for Malawian doctors: training all in Malawi, split be-
tween Malawi and South Africa, all in South Africa, or all outside
Africa.
 Specialty. Here, we wanted to investigate the trade-offs partici-
pants would be willing to make between different types of
specialties and other aspects of a job. Employing named spe-
cialties as levels would provide little information other than
their relative popularity. Instead, we formulated two levels as
“1st choice” core specialty and “2nd choice” core specialty in
order to explore the willingness of junior doctors in Malawi to
compromise on future specialty. Only the core specialties were
included here due to their familiarity to participants. So as to
minimise misunderstandings around the terms, clear de-
scriptions and instructions were included in the questionnaire.
The third level was ophthalmology in order to investigate the
incentives required to increase the uptake of less favoured but
priority specialties. Finally, public health was included as a non-
clinical specialty that is traditionally popular in Malawi, both
due to the disease burden and a perception of access to well-
paying jobs in non-governmental organisations. We had
hoped to include family medicine to assess the attractiveness of
generalist versus specialist training, however our target popu-
lation were not sufﬁciently familiar with the specialty as it had
only been recently introduced in Malawi.
We also included an opt-out option that participants could
choose instead of making a choice between the job alternatives. The
inclusion of an opt-out option avoids a “forced choice” that can
overestimate the strength of preferences associated with alterna-
tives (Carson et al., 1994; King et al., 2007; Louviere and Lancsar,
2009; Olsen and Swait, 1997; M Ryan and Skatun, 2004). Howev-
er, if the opt-out is chosen by the majority of participants, there is a
risk of obtaining insufﬁcient data. We therefore included a two-
stage choice, ﬁrst with an opt-out and then forcing participants
to choose between the jobs on offer. Fig. 1 shows an example of the
choice task.
2.2. Experimental design and piloting
Five attributes, all with four levels, gives 1024 possible combi-
nations (45) and 523,776 potential choice tasks ((1024  1023)/2)
(M Ryan et al., 2012). With four levels, at least 16 choice tasks were
needed for level balance. Our systematic review also identiﬁed that
16e20 choice tasks was the mode for previous DCEs administered
to health workers (Mandeville et al., 2014a). We therefore used a D-
efﬁcient design in Ngene version 1.1.1 (ChoiceMetrics Pty Ltd,
Sydney) to create a main effects design with 16 choice tasks. All
parameter estimates were set to zero at this stage (see below). A
multinomial logit model was speciﬁed, with the model averaging
feature in Ngene used to evaluate designs for utility functions with
and without an opt-out option.
In order to familiarise participants with the choice tasks and
diminish the impact of learning effects on early responses (Lancsar
and Louviere, 2006), participants completed ten practice exercises.
These built up gradually from a choice between one attribute only
to a full choice task. An accompanying questionnaire included
questions on sociodemographic characteristics, current job and
employment history, and attitudes towards specialist training. Aspart of the latter, we asked participants to indicate for 13 specialties
whether: (i) they would want to train in it; (ii) they would consider
training in it; or (iii) they would prefer not to train in it. Responses
to these questions were used to construct a 13-point “specialty
ﬂexibility index”, with a positive response to (i) or (ii) scoring one
point. Higher/lower scores on the index therefore indicate greater/
lesser ﬂexibility in specialty training choices.
We carried out a two-stage pilot: (i) pre-testing the question-
naire and choice tasks on 15 doctors who had participated in the
qualitative work, with modiﬁcation of wording and layout between
participants based on feedback; (ii) a formal pilot of the initial DCE
design on 16 doctors in order to obtain parameter priors
(ChoiceMetrics Pty Ltd, 2012). Choice data from the pilot were
analysed using a multinomial logit model in NLOGIT 4.0 (Econo-
metric Software, Inc, Plainview). A design incorporating these
parameter estimates with random distributions was run in Ngene
using 1000 Sobol draws for 250,000 iterations in order to obtain the
ﬁnal survey design (Bliemer et al., 2008). To avoid primacy effects,
two versions of choice tasks were produced with a reversed order
and participants allocated to versions using a computer-generated
random sequence.
2.3. Participants
The target population was all junior doctors (deﬁned as within
seven years of graduation) in Malawi who had not yet started
specialty training. We had initially planned to use COM graduate
lists along with Ministry of Health routine data to identify eligible
participants, however these were quickly found to be out of date.
We therefore complemented these routine data sources with up-
to-date data on participants obtained through social media: an
innovative process described elsewhere (Mandeville et al., 2014b).
As our focus was on national retention policies, non-Malawian
citizens and those who had completed any undergraduate
training outside of Malawi were excluded (n ¼ 20). Out of 279
graduates between 2006 and 2012, 153 were eligible (Mandeville
et al., 2014b).
2.4. Data collection
Data collectionwas carried out over August 2012 to March 2013,
with 2012 graduates interviewed after at least six months' work
experience. Participants were invited to participate through social
media, telephone or direct contact depending on their location. One
of two research assistants administered the survey at participants'
place of work. All participants received written and oral in-
structions, including an explanation of all attributes and levels.
Participants completed paper survey booklets under the supervi-
sion of the research assistant. Participants received a small medical
textbook as compensation for their time. Ethical approval was ob-
tained from the research ethics committees of COM and the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, with informed consent
obtained from all participants.
2.5. Analysis
Results were analysed using Stata 12 and NLOGIT 5.0 (Econo-
metric Software, Inc, Plainview). Job location, specialty and training
location were effects coded, with the estimate for the reference
(omitted) level reconstructed bymultiplying the values for all other
levels by 1 and summing (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005). Salary
and time before training were tested for linearity before coding
continuously. While the effect for time before training was likely to
be non-linear, model performance worsened considerably when
coded as three separate parameters, therefore we chose continuous
Fig. 1. An example choice task.
Table 1
Comparison of model ﬁt measures.
Number of latent classes 2 3 4 5
Parameters 28 44 60 76
Observations 2240 2240 2240 2240
Log-likelihood function 2073.94 1972.09 1860.07 1845.81
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.25
AIC 4203.90 4032.20 3840.10 3843.60
AICc 4204.63 4034.00 3843.46 3849.01
BIC 4363.88 4283.61 4182.99 4277.90
Notes: AIC¼ Akaike information criterion; AICc¼ Akaike information criterion with
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option was coded with zero for all attributes.
An initial exploratory analysis was undertaken using a multi-
nomial logit model (see supplementary ﬁle). This model does not
take account of variation in preferences between respondents,
however, for which mixed logit or latent class models are
commonly used (Amaya-Amaya et al., 2008; de Bekker-Grob et al.,
2012). Latent classmodels are semi-parametric models that assume
that there are underlying subgroups (classes) of participants with
similar preferences (Greene and Hensher, 2003). Membership of
these classes characterised by unobserved (latent) variables, the
nature of which may be inferred through observed variables. The
analyst must stipulate the number of classes and which observed
variables to include in the model. Within each class, choice prob-
abilities are generated by the multinomial logit model (Greene,
2012). A posterior probability of belonging to each class is pro-
duced by the model for every participant. In order to describe each
subgroup, it is possible to allocate each participant to a class based
on their highest probability and then compare characteristics of
participants across classes (Lagarde et al., 2014). In this way, latent
class models are particularly well suited for policy-facing research,
as distinct classes with speciﬁc policy recommendations creates a
strong narrative for targeted policy actions.
We estimated latent class models with two to ﬁve classes, a
panel speciﬁcation, and observed variables that have been shownto be correlated with job and training preferences. These included:
age, gender, year of graduation, marital status (married/relation-
ship > 1 year vs. single/relationship < 1 year), children (yes vs. no),
type of upbringing (rural vs. urban), current salary, number of de-
pendents (includes extended family members in Malawi,
<6 vs.  6), previous district work experience (yes vs. no), ever
travelled outside of Africa (yes vs. no), parents' education level
(either parent completed tertiary education vs. neither), time
looking for a specialty training scholarship and the speciality ﬂex-
ibility index. A comparison of model ﬁt measures (Akaike, corrected
Akaike and Bayesian information criterions) showed that the best
ﬁtting model for the data comprised four latent classes and incor-
porated three observed variables: age, specialty ﬂexibility index,a correction for ﬁnite sample sizes; BIC ¼ Bayesian information criterion.
Fig. 2. Willingness to pay. Positive values indicate the amount of future income participants would give up in order to gain a unit increase or level change in an attribute, whereas
negative values indicate the amount that a participant would want as compensation. Reference levels ¼ Major central hospital, 1st choice core specialty and training all in South
Africa. 95% conﬁdence intervals shown.
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We calculated marginal willingness to pay values, which can be
interpreted as the compensating wage differential for a change in a
single attribute change (Scott et al., 2013). Positive values indicate
the amount of future income participants would give up in order to
gain a unit increase or level change in an attribute, whereas
negative values indicate the amount that a participant would want
as compensation (Sivey et al., 2012). With effects coding, each co-
efﬁcient represents the absolute utility of that level, rather than the
marginal change from the reference level as with dummy coding.
Therefore the marginal utility of a change between levels is given
by the difference between their coefﬁcients, which was then
divided by the salary coefﬁcient. For attribute k with four levels (l1
to l4), with level 1 as the omitted reference level, the willingness to
pay for a change from level 1 to level 4 is then:
WTPkg ¼
bkl4  ð  bkl2  bkl3  bkl4Þ
bg
where bg is the marginal utility of income and (bkl2 bkl3 bkl4) is
the recovered coefﬁcient for the omitted reference level (Scott et al.,
2013). 95% conﬁdence intervals were calculated using the delta
method (Hole, 2007).2.6. Policy scenarios
We then used simulation to predict the uptake of training posts
under different hypothetical scenarios that could inform two key
policy objectives in Malawi. The ﬁrst was tomaximise service in the
public sector in exchange for training in favoured specialties. Here,
we set the attributes of the ﬁrst scenario to represent a common
training pathway in Malawi: two years working in a district hos-
pital near town at basic salary before training in a 1st choice core
specialty inMalawi and South Africa. We then simulated the impact
on job uptake of increasing lengths of mandatory service and
remote location over four further scenarios. The predicted proba-
bilities were simulated over two alternatives, Job A and the opt-out
option, as there was no difference between Job A and Job B in thisscenario.
The second examined strategies to increase the uptake of un-
popular but priority specialties. Here, the attributes of Job A were
ﬁxed to represent the common training pathway above as the
baseline scenario. Job B, in comparison, represents the type of
training post in ophthalmology that had been reportedly difﬁcult to
ﬁll (Scenario 1). Over Scenarios 2 to 4, Job B becomes increasingly
incentivised through increased salary, shortened time before
training, and training in Malawi and South Africa, with the uptake
in each class noted each time.3. Results
3.1. Participant characteristics
The response rate was 96.7% (149/153). There were very few
graduates eligible from 2006 to 2007, as many were training or
working outside Malawi (Mandeville et al., 2014b). As it was clear
that we had deﬁned our target population toowidely for this choice
problem, we excluded participants who had graduated in 2006
(8.3% of total graduates, 2/24) and 2007 (17.1%, 6/35). The ﬁnal
sample comprised 140 doctors, with 87 (62.1%) males and amedian
age of 25 years (SD 2.68). Gender data for the entire cohort shows
63.6% of these graduates are male, indicating that this sample is
likely to be broadly representative (Mandeville et al., 2014b). The
median monthly net salary was MWK 108,000 ($404), the starting
salary in the public sector at that time. All doctors except one stated
that they wished to specialise in the future, with three quarters
currently looking for a training scholarship. When participants
were asked which specialties they would consider training in,
public health and epidemiology was the most popular specialty for
training followed by the four core specialties, with psychiatry,
dermatology and ophthalmology the least preferred (see
supplementary ﬁle).3.2. Preferences
All 140 participants completed all 16 choice tasks, giving 2240
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a substantial use of the opt-out option, however there was sufﬁ-
cient information to run the model with the opt-out option,
therefore we did not analyse the forced choice data.
When the results of the four-class latent class model are
examined (see supplementary ﬁle), doctors across all classes
preferred higher salaries and less time before training. Training
undertaken exclusively in Malawi is universally unattractive, with
most preferring training in South Africa or outside Africa. The
preferences for specialty are generally highly signiﬁcant, indicating
their importance in junior doctors' job choices, in comparison to job
location that did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence doctors' choices for the
most part. Most junior doctors would prefer to train in core spe-
cialties than ophthalmology, with divided preferences for training
in public health.
When willingness to pay values are compared across the four
classes (Fig. 2), the strength of preferences for specialty in com-
parison to other attributes is striking. To train in ophthalmology
rather than their ﬁrst choice core specialty, junior doctors would
need to be paid an extra MWK 89,589 to 691,804 ($334 to 2581) per
month. To accept training in their second rather than ﬁrst choice
core specialty, doctors would require an extra MWK 37,470 to
62,573 ($140 to 538) per month. Training undertaken exclusively in
Malawi would necessitate an extra MWK 90,257 to 106,760 ($282
to 398) per month for most doctors: a near doubling of basic salary.
In contrast, doctors in class 1 would give up nearly half the basic
salary (MWK 44,031, $164) to train outside Africa. For each year
spent working before training, doctors would require an extra
MWK 22,411 to 60,669 ($84 to 226) in monthly salary. Willingness
to pay for changes in job location was smaller. Doctors in class 1
would give up MWK 56, 311 ($210) in order to work at a district
hospital near a major town, whereas doctors in class 3 would
require a near doubling in basic salary (MWK 105,841; $395) to
work at a remote district hospital. Of note, the constant for the opt-
out option was signiﬁcant in class 1. This indicates that these doc-
tors considered opting out regardless of the attributes on offer.3.3. Subgroup descriptions
Based on posterior probabilities (of which 94%were between 0.9
and 1.0), we assigned each participant to a class and compared data
obtained from the accompanying questionnaire across classesTable 2
Characteristics of latent classes.
Characteristic Class 1
N ¼ 43 (30.7%)
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female (N, %) 18 (41.9)
Median age in years (N, SD)** 25 (2.2)
Mean net monthly salary in MWK
(N, SD)**a
147,193 (102,973)
Working outside public sector (N, %) 4 (9.3)
District experience (N, %)** 12 (27.9)
Rural upbringing (N, %) 8 (18.6)
Married or relationship>1 year (N, %) 24 (55.8)
Children under 11 years old (N, %) 8 (18.6)
Six or more dependents (N, %)* 7 (16.3)
Attitudes to specialty training
Specialty ﬂexibility index (N, SD)*** 6.0 (2.4)
Currently looking for specialty training funding (N, %) 32 (74.4)
Median months looking for funding (N, SD)b 3 (16.6)
Notes: N¼ number; SD¼ standard deviation; MWK¼Malawian Kwacha; District experie
chi-squared tests show signiﬁcant differences across classes at the **5% or ***1% level; *
a Bartlett's test for unequal variance signiﬁcant for original and log transformed data,
b Bartlett's test for unequal variance signiﬁcant, therefore log transformation used ins(Table 2). By comparing these with preferences obtained from the
DCE (Fig. 2), broad descriptions of each subgroup can be arrived at
in order to highlight key differences and policy implications. We
describe the four subgroups seen here as the “rich rejecters”,
“stubborn specialists”, “money motivated” and “pliant patriots”.
The “rich rejecters”, comprising Class 1 and a third of partici-
pants, were the only subgroup for whom the opt-out option was
consistently more attractive than the jobs on offer and were also
earning signiﬁcantly more than their peers (1.5 times the sample
mean salary). Although not signiﬁcant, more doctors were outside
the public sector in this group than the other three classes. These
results suggest that public sector jobs, even with guaranteed spe-
cialty training and higher salaries, are unattractive to these doctors,
who may be difﬁcult to retain in the public sector in the long-term.
The “stubborn specialists”, Class 2 and also a third of partici-
pants, displayed the strongest specialty preferences of all sub-
groups and the highest disutility with accepting their 2nd rather
than 1st choice core specialty. They also had strong preferences on
the location of this training, requiring the highest compensation if
all in Malawi. They tended to be younger than their peers and less
likely to have worked at district level.
The “money motivated”, Class 3 and the smallest subgroup, had
the largest preference for salary increases and would require the
least compensation of all subgroups for more time working before
training. Around a third of this subgroup had six or more de-
pendents, signiﬁcantly more than other subgroups. This was the
only subgroup who preferred to train in public health rather than
the other specialities, yet would also require the greatest
compensation for working in a remote district hospital.
The “pliant patriots”, Class 4 and a ﬁfth of the population,
required the least compensation to train all in Malawi and were the
only subgroup for which training all outside Africa or in ophthal-
mology did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their choices. They also
scored signiﬁcantly higher on the specialty ﬂexibility index and did
not require signiﬁcant compensation to train in their 2nd choice
core specialty in contrast to the other subgroups. They tended to be
older than their peers and had the lowest mean salary, but were no
more likely to have family reasons to remain in Malawi.3.4. Policy scenarios
The ﬁrst policy simulation assessed the extent to which serviceClass 2 Class 3 Class 4
N ¼ 43 (30.8%) N ¼ 23 (16.0%) N ¼ 31 (22.6%)
19 (44.2) 5 (21.7) 11 (35.5)
24 (2.4) 25 (3.5) 26 (2.6)
123,884 (79,904) 112,827 (20,242) 108,633 (2822)
1 (2.3) 2 (8.7) 1 (3.2)
4 (9.3) 9 (39.1) 10 (32.3)
8 (18.6) 5 (21.7) 4 (12.9)
16 (37.2) 11 (47.8) 17 (54.8)
1 (2.3) 3 (13.0) 3 (9.7)
4 (9.3) 7 (30.4) 2 (6.5)
6.0 (2.5) 5.0 (2.3) 7.4 (2.5)
33 (76.7) 15 (65.2) 21 (67.7)
3 (6.4) 3 (5.4) 4 (7.5)
nce signiﬁes current or previous job at district level; One-way analysis of variance or
Approaching signiﬁcance with P-value of 0.056.
therefore Kruskal-Wallis test used instead.
tead.
Fig. 3. Maximising public sector service in exchange for preferred training. Scenario 1 represents a common training pathway in Malawi of two years working in a district
hospital near town at basic salary before access to training in a preferred core specialty. Scenarios 2 to 5 simulate the impact of increasing lengths of mandatory service and remote
location on job uptake. MWK ¼ Malawian kwacha; SA ¼ South Africa.
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popular specialties (Fig. 3). Our baseline scenario represents a
common pathway to specialty training in Malawi with two years
working in a district hospital at a starting salary, before training in a
1st choice core specialty inMalawi and South Africa. Nine out of ten
stubborn specialists and money motivated doctors would accept
this job, compared to just one in two rich rejecters. As the job
evolves to onewith longermandatory service before training in less
favourable locations, the uptake among rich rejecters drops steeply
but remains considerable for the other three subgroups. Even fac-
ing ﬁve years in a remote district hospital at basic pay, more than a
third of all junior doctors in these classes would accept this job in
exchange for favoured training, rising to 85% among stubborn
specialists.
The second series of policy simulations examined possible in-
centives to improve uptake of training in priority but unpopular
specialties. Here, each job is compared against a baseline scenario
to estimate the proportion of doctors that could be persuaded to
take up training in ophthalmology over a common training
pathway. As can be seen from Fig. 4, despite increasing incentives in
terms of time before training, location of training, and salary, the
uptake is minimal across all subgroups except the pliant patriots. In
the ﬁnal scenario, nearly one in two pliant patriots would choose a
job training in ophthalmology with multiple incentives.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Junior doctors in Malawi do not value all specialty training
equally, but prefer timely training outside of Malawi in corespecialties. Specialty preferences are particularly strong, with most
junior doctors requiring nearly double their monthly salary to
accept training all in Malawi and over six-fold to accept training in
ophthalmology compared to their preferred core specialty. In
contrast, the location of work before training did not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence most doctors' choice when guaranteed specialty training.
We identiﬁed four subgroups of junior doctors with distinct pref-
erences. Policy simulations showed that these can be leveraged by
policymakers to maximise service in the public sector in exchange
for guaranteed training in popular specialties, however incentivis-
ing the uptake of training in priority specialties will only be effec-
tive in those with more ﬂexible preferences.
While previous discrete choice experiments have established
the importance of postgraduate training to health workers, this is
the ﬁrst study to examine whether all postgraduate training is
valued equally (Mandeville et al., 2014a). Our results indicate that
indiscriminate expansion of postgraduate training to slow
emigration of doctors from sub-Saharan African countries may not
be effective unless doctors' preferences are taken into account.
Considerable divergence in these preferences was revealed through
the ﬁrst use to our knowledge of a latent class model in this area of
application. Interpretation of willingness to pay values, however,
should be cautious given their sensitivity to the levels stipulated for
the salary attribute (M. Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000; Sivey et al.,
2012; Slothuus Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen, 2003). Indeed, the
level range could have been widened even further given the strong
preferences for the type of specialty training, particularly among
the stubborn specialists subgroup. A major limitation is the highly
constrained sample size, which is likely to have limited the power
Fig. 4. Improving uptake of priority specialties. The baseline scenario represents a common training pathway in Malawi. Scenario 1 represents the type of training post in
ophthalmology that had been reportedly difﬁcult to ﬁll. Scenarios 2 to 4 offer increasing incentives to take up such a training post. MWK ¼ Malawian kwacha; SA ¼ South Africa.
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observed variables. Moreover, a larger number of choice tasks
divided into blocks would have been more appropriate to support
model identiﬁcation with the ﬁnal number of eligible participants.
This is a near complete census of the eligible population in Malawi,
however, and in line with previous DCEs in LMIC (Mandeville et al.,
2014a). Indeed, as ﬁnite population corrections are not possible for
these models, it is likely that the signiﬁcance levels shown here are
conservative. Finally, the stated preferences elicited by discrete
choice experiments may be seen to be inferior to the revealed
preferences gleaned from controlled or observational studies. Yet
controlled experiments, while aspirational, are politically difﬁcult
to perform on workforces. Observational studies are unable to
distinguish the independent effects of attributes made possible
through the experimental design of discrete choice experiments.
Finally, in lower-income settings, resource constraints may restrict
the options that can be offered to doctors, meaning that observable
choices may not reﬂect true preferences.
Our ﬁndings concur with other studies demonstrating the value
placed on postgraduate training by doctors and medical students
compared to other job attributes, although these studies focused on
attraction and retention in rural areas (Lagarde et al., 2013; Rao
et al., 2013; Rockers et al., 2012; M Vujicic et al., 2010; Marko
Vujicic et al., 2011). One other discrete choice experiment has
explored specialty preferences, with Sivey et al. investigating the
generic aspects of a specialty that increase its attractiveness to
Australian junior doctors and ﬁnding a substantial effect of future
earnings on specialty choice (Sivey et al., 2012). While these ﬁnd-
ings are from a high-income setting, the strong specialty prefer-
ences seen here may reﬂect perceived opportunities for private
practice or, in the case of public health, well-paying jobs with non-
government organisations (Bailey et al., 2012). Sivey et al. also
found that doctors with higher levels of educational debt placedgreater value on future earnings. Financial constraints may also
have inﬂuenced the preferences of the money motivated subgroup,
who supported more dependents, seldom opted out of the jobs on
offer, and placed the highest value of all subgroups on public health
training (despite disliking district-level work). While preferences
for training location were not as strong as for the specialty itself,
our results corroborate qualitative ﬁndings thatmost junior doctors
inMalawi are reluctant to accept training all in Malawi (Bailey et al.,
2012; Sawatsky et al., 2014). We did, however, identify a minority
who were indifferent to training in higher-income settings and this
proportion may increase as domestic training becomes more
established. Three other studies have identiﬁed substantial het-
erogeneity in preferences for specialty training, although none
using a latent class model (Lagarde et al., 2013; Rockers et al., 2012;
M Vujicic et al., 2010). In particular, Vujicic et al. examined job
preferences of ﬁnal-year medical students and graduated doctors
(mean age 42) in Vietnam, ﬁnding that the most important attri-
bute for students was guaranteed specialty training after ﬁve years,
with a six-fold difference in willingness to pay compared to that of
doctors (who most valued working in an urban area) (M Vujicic
et al., 2010). We found that younger doctors had more ﬁxed spe-
cialty preferences than older doctors, who were more willing to
compromise on aspects of training. This suggests a critical window
soon after graduation in which to leverage specialty training as an
incentive, after which doctors place greater importance on other
aspects of a job.
The broad conclusions from our results are likely to be gen-
eralisable to the many other sub-Saharan African countries at the
same juncture in their domestic medical training (Mullan et al.,
2011). For example, many countries in the region are struggling
to increase their ophthalmologist workforce in line with agreed
targets and a growing burden of eye disease (Palmer et al., 2014).
Our results suggest that any investment into scaling up training
K.L. Mandeville et al. / Social Science & Medicine 169 (2016) 109e118 117should focus on those with more ﬂexible preferences. These “pliant
patriots” could be identiﬁed soon after graduation and targeted for
fast-track training in priority specialties with an incentive package.
In the same way, the ﬁrm training preferences of other junior
doctors could be leveraged by stipulating several years of service in
posts facing recruitment problems, e.g. remote district hospitals, as
entry criteria for training in favoured specialties.
Our results provide clear evidence that postgraduate training is
not a straightforward incentive, and future studies would beneﬁt
from more detailed exploration of this attribute. Future research
following up career choices in this cohort would shed light on the
predictive validity of subgroup preferences, e.g. whether pliant
patriots tend to take up training in Malawi. It would also allow
insight into the effectiveness of specialty training for retention in
the long-term, for which there is currently no evidence to our
knowledge. Finally, no choice is without cost, and the cost-
effectiveness of providing specialty training in Malawi given the
preferences identiﬁed here is also a key research question.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.09.034.
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